A Person`s Legal Personality Is Terminated Le 27 septembre 2022
The typical relationship between a director of Juris Alieni and his tutor has the following form. The guardian has a fiduciary duty to use his or her powers of representation to promote the interests of the client. Any legal advantage resulting from the application of these powers will revert to the principal, and any legal disadvantage will be borne by the principal – unless the disadvantage is due to the guardian`s breach of fiduciary duties. Thus, if the guardian takes out health insurance for the principal with company C, the principal is obviously entitled to the health insurance services that C is required to provide.37 On the other hand, the premiums must be paid by the tutor, but with the client`s money. If the guardian is negligent in paying premiums, any additional costs arising from the negligence are usually borne by the guardian and not by the client. In legal proceedings concerning animals, animals have the status of « legal person » and humans have a legal obligation to act as « loco parentis » towards animal welfare, as a parent has done towards minor children. A court that ruled in the Animal Welfare Board of India vs Nagaraja case in 2014 ordered that animals also have the right to the fundamental right to liberty[23] enshrined in Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, i.e. the right to life, personal liberty and the right to die with dignity (passive euthanasia). In another case, a court in the state of Uttarakhand ordered that animals have the same rights as humans. In another case of cow smuggling, the Supreme Court of Punjab and Haryana ordered that « the entire animal kingdom, including bird and water species », have an « independent legal personality with the appropriate rights, duties and duties of a living person » and that people be « loco parentis » while setting animal welfare standards, veterinary treatment, food and shelter, e.g. pet carts may not have more than four people, and goods transport animals must not be loaded beyond the established limits and these limit values must be halved if the animals are to carry the load on a slope.
[22] Instead of asserting that any entity could be a legal entity, as Naffine claims, the views presented here do something else: they situate the legal entity only in the normative world, as a set of legal rights and obligations. Such beams are indeed « defined in existence » (in a certain sense of « defining »), but it does not follow that they can be attributed to absolutely all entities. A distinction must be made between doctrinal questions and philosophical analysis. Stone`s writings are enshrined in the U.S. legal system, where, in a typical case, a plaintiff has standing to bring an action only if he has suffered direct harm or damage or is likely to suffer harm as a result of the defendant`s past, present, or future conduct. If such a doctrine of legal status exists and the only legally recognized damages are damages to legal persons, then the obligation not to cause environmental damage is real (and therefore enforceable) only if the environmental damage affects the clearly identifiable interests of a legal person. Stone is therefore faced with a very practical reason to personify the environment: as already mentioned, the supposed recognition of the legal personality of idols and rivers by legal systems can lead to the adoption of an « anything is allowed » view of passive legal personality, according to which a legal system can treat virtually anything as a legal entity. Such a temptation must be resisted. Of course, it is clear that a legal platform can somehow be connected with almost any physical object. The legal platform « Te Awa Tupua » is related to the existence of the Whanganui River: presumably, if the river ceased to exist (perhaps due to a natural disaster), the corresponding legal platform would also be dissolved. I call this a weak attachment. The weak attachment of a platform to an entity means that the existence of the platform depends on the existence of the entity, just as the existence of the natural legal platform « John Smith » depends mainly on the life of John Smith.34 The legal regulations concerning the Whanganui River differ from a typical society in this regard.
However, this weak attachment of a legal platform to a physical object does not yet constitute a legal person for the object of attribution. Consider, for example, an organization whose purpose is the preservation of a particular ancient manuscript. Let`s say that if the manuscript is destroyed, the organization is dissolved. The organization`s legal platform therefore weakly adheres to the manuscript. Nevertheless, the manuscript is not a legal entity. For example, let`s say that two villages on neighboring islands form a joint fire organization tasked with putting out fires on both islands. However, the representatives of the two villages are aware that the old bridge connecting the two villages will only remain functional for a few years, and it is therefore agreed that the organization will be dissolved as soon as the bridge is no longer in working order. Nevertheless, the bridge is not a legal entity. In short, a weak link alone cannot justify the legal entity for the purpose of the link. In some common law jurisdictions, a corporate aggregate (e.g., a company composed of a certain number of partners) and a sole proprietorship, which is a public office with the legal personality distinct from the person holding the office (the two companies have a separate legal personality). Historically, most businesses have been exclusively ecclesiastical in nature (for example, the office of the Archbishop of Canterbury is a single body), but a number of other public offices are now established as sole proprietorships. In addition to the incorporation of a legal platform and its separation from other entities of this type, a third feature of legal platforms is that they are usually named with proper names or other designations to distinguish the respective platform from other platforms.31 The naming of legal platforms partly explains claims that beings like rivers could be legal entities, because of course, we can call a legal platform « the Whanganui River ».
The concept of legal entity is at the heart of Western law today, both in common law countries and in civil law countries, but it can also be found in virtually all legal systems. [12] There are therefore two types of legal entities: human persons and non-human persons. In law, a human person is called a natural person (sometimes also a natural person), and a non-human person is called a legal person (sometimes also as a legal, legal, artificial, legal or fictitious person, Latin: persona ficta). The active legal person therefore consists of two main events: legal liability (incriminating legal person) and the ability to act within the framework of the law (endowed with legal competences). The main types of legal liability are criminal and civil liability, while the ability to perform legal acts opens up the possibility of participating in various legal institutions, probably the most important of which is procurement. Many scholars distinguish between the status of « beneficiary » of rights and that of « administrator » of rights.49 This distinction highlights a relevant threshold between the passive legal person and the active legal person: an infant cannot manage his physical legal platform, but a legal system generally grants him an increasing number of administrative capacities as he grows. It will also be increasingly held accountable for how it exercises these powers.